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SHAPING THE CONTOURS OF THE NEWSPERSON'S
PRIVILEGE-GILBERT v. ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP.
The newsperson's privilege' to protect the identity of news sources and
the content of information accumulated in preparing a news story has
received little attention from the United States Supreme Court. In its
only ruling on the issue, the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes2 held that the
1. The privilege issue essentially is a conflict between the First Amendment's protection
of the flow of information to the public and the Sixth Amendment's protection of an
orderly administration of justice. This controversy focuses on the right of the press to
transmit news and the right of the public to receive that information versus the right of
litigants to procure evidence and have access to a fair trial. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Liddy,
354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429
(1974).
The controversy, dating back more than 125 years, originally centered on whether a
newsperson could keep confidential sources secret. It then was expanded to include
whether the content of confidences could be protected by any grant of privilege. See
Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions
and Private Litigation, 58 CAUF. L. REv. 1198 (1970). To compensate for the lack of a
common law recognition of protection for a newsperson's notions of confidentiality, "shield
laws" have been passed in more than half the states in order to create an occupational
privilege similar to privileges already available in relationships such as attorney-client,
confessor-penitent, or doctor-patient. Note, Reporter's Privilege-Guardian of the Peo-
ple's Right to Know, 11 N. ENG. L. REv. 405, 414-418 (1976).
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg involved three cases consolidated on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. App. 1971),
focused on a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal who wrote a series of articles based
on his observation of two men preparing hashish. Subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury investigating the drug culture, Branzburg refused to identify the men. He then sought
review of the denial of his second motion to quash a second subpoena for another story he
wrote concerning conversations with area drug users. The reporter relied heavily on the
Kentucky shield law which seemed to provide absolute protection for confidential sources.
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), concerned a New York Times
reporter who was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury to testify about the operations
of the Black Panther Party that he had been assigned to investigate. The United States
petitioned for certiorari after the Ninth Circuit reversed a contempt order against Cald-
well for his refusal to testify. In the course of litigation in the lower courts, the reporter
was granted not only a privilege for confidential materials but also a right not to appear
at all before the grand jury when he argued that even an appearance would compromise
his effectiveness as a reporter.
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), centered on a television newsman
who gained access to the Black Panther headquarters on his pledge not to report any
activities except an anticipated police raid. The Supreme Court granted Pappas' writ of
certiorari after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied his motion to quash
a subpoena seeking his testimony on activities at the Panthers' headquarters.
In June 1972, the Supreme Court affirmed the Branzburg and Pappas holdings and
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First Amendment does not protect newspersons from being forced to
reveal confidential sources when subpoenaed by a grand jury during a
criminal investigation' Subsequent to that decision, the Court resumed
a pattern of denying certiorari to other cases advocating a constitution-
ally guaranteed privilege.4 This placed the burden on the lower courts
to determine whether the Constitution confers a privilege in judicial
settings other than grand jury investigations.' Confronted with the prob-
lem of resolving conflicts in which Branzburg is not directly applicable,
the lower courts have developed the law of newsperson's privilege on a
case-by-case basis.6
reversed the Caldwell decision. Thus, the Court held that newsmen could be required to
disclose confidential sources to a grand jury conducting a criminal investigation. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 667.
3. 408 U.S. at 667.
4. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), was an
unsuccessful attempt to get the Supreme Court to review the newsperson's privilege issue.
In Torre, a constitutional claim to protect confidentiality emerged for the first time and
relegated the unsuccessful common law claim for an occupational privilege to secondary
status. Torre involved an alleged libel and breach of contract and was decided against
columnist Marie Torre who refused to divulge the name of the CBS executive who criti-
cized singer Judy Garland. Disclosure was demanded because, according to the opinion
written by then-Judge Stewart, the material sought went to "the heart of the plaintiff's
claim." 259 F.2d at 550. That language was construed in subsequent cases as absolutely
barring a newsman's claim to privilege under the First Amendment. See also State v.
Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (grand jury
investigation into alleged drug abuse on university campus that had been described in
articles in student newspaper).
After the Branzburg decision, the Court has consistently denied certiorari. Cases where
review was sought include Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973), where lower federal courts held that revelation of the real
name of a realtor who helped write an article on blockbusting under a pseudonym was
not crucial enough to the case to warrant infringement of First Amendment rights. See
also Lightman v. State, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951
(1973); In re Bride, 120 N.J.Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991
(1973); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App.3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
5. Privilege problems usually arise in four legal contexts: (1) general investigations,
such as by a grand jury or a legislative committee; (2) criminal trials; (3) civil litigation
where the newspersons are third parties; and (4) civil litigation where a member of the
news media is a party, such as a libel case. See Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional
Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 18, 20 (1969).
6. This development clearly was encouraged in Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opi-
nion in Branzburg:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of
these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by.case basis accords
[Vol. 26:185
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In one of the most recent decisions in a series7 following Branzburg, a
federal district court ruled, in Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp.,' that
the First Amendment9 guarantees reporters'0 a qualified privilege to
protect confidential news sources in civil proceedings. The court de-
cided, however, that constitutional protection for the free flow of infor-
mation" does not extend to unpublished materials that are not confi-
dential.12
The privilege issue in Gilbert emerged when the plaintiffs filed a tort
action for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of contact with
a chemical compound commonly known as Kepone. Allied Chemical,
one of the corporate defendants in the suit, sought pre-trial discovery
from the radio and television stations that exposed problems in the
Kepone manufacturing process at the Hopewell, Virginia plant. A broad
subpoena duces tecum 3 requested that the owner of the stations, Na-
with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
7. The cases prior to Gilbert contain some obvious contradictions. See, e.g., Baker v. F
& F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), which limited Branzburg to criminal proceed-
ings, while Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), extended Branzburg to civil
cases. For a brief summary of major litigation, see Note, Branzburg Revisited: The Con-
tinuing Search for a Testimonial Privilege for Newsmen, 11 TULSA L.J. 258 (1975). For a
sampling of reported and unreported decisions that points out the chaos among the cir-
cuits and between the states, see D. GORDON, NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE AND THE LAW (1974).
8. 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
9. The First Amendment reads in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. The words "reporters" and "newspersons" are used interchangeably throughout this
Note to refer to persons who fill a variety of roles, including news reporters, copyeditors,
editors, and publishers in any form of the media-radio, television, newspapers, maga-
zines, and pamphlets.
Most courts use the term "newsmen" very loosely. Legislative attempts to be more
specific with "shield laws," statutes that create a newsman's privilege, have often created
more problems than they have resolved. See Comment, Constitutional Protection for the
Newsman's Work Product, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lis. L. REV. 119, 121-22 (1970); Note,
Reporter's Privilege-Guardian of the People's Right to Know?, 11 N. ENG. L. REV. 405
(1976).
11. 411 F. Supp. at 508.
12. Id. at 511.
13. The defendant requested that the following subpoena be directed at Nationwide
Communications, Inc.:
With respect to WLEE radio and WXEX-TV, please bring with you: All docu-
ments, transcripts, memoranda, writings and recordings of any nature what-
soever of all news stories, editorials, opinion polls, questionnaires, dialogues or
conversations that have been broadcasted or drafted, taken, made or secured in
contemplation of being broadcasted since January 1, 1973, in respect of or in
any wise connected to the chemical compound popularly called Kepone.
Id. at 507 (emphasis added by court).
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tionwide Communications, Inc., produce all published and nonpub-
lished materials, both confidential and nonconfidential, contained in
the files of its media subsidiaries that "broke" the story." Information
from sources who requested secrecy was classified as confidential,"'
while material gathered from other media outlets, such as wire service
copy and press releases, was labeled nonconfidential.1" Allied contended
that information in the files was crucial to the presentation of its case
and necessary to substantiate a request for a change of venue due to
allegedly prejudicial pre-trial publicity. 7 After providing the published
materials, Nationwide sought to quash the subpoena for unpublished
information, arguing it was oppressive, unreasonable, and beyond the
permissible scope of discovery. 8 The District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia ruled that a qualified privilege protects against the
disclosure of confidential sources, but that nonconfidential matters are
open to discovery.
Gilbert reinforces the prevailing view of lower courts that the Consti-
tution allows privileged treatment of confidential matters in specific
circumstances. This Note will point out, however, that Gilbert confuses
the question of whether constitutional protection should be extended to
nonconfidential materials.
In granting a privilege for confidential matters, the Gilbert court out-
lined a familiar dichotomy between civil and criminal proceedings.
The Gilbert opinion distinguished the context of the case at bar from
that of Branzburg, emphasizing that Branzburg denied a First Amend-
ment privilege only when news reporters are subpoenaed in a criminal
grand jury investigation."0 Adopting this distinction, the district court
14. Memorandum of Nationwide Communications, Inc. at 19, Gilbert v. Allied Chemi-
cal Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
15. 411 F. Supp. at 511.
16. Material classified as nonconfidential included press clippings, information from
other general sources, such as books, journals and documents, unedited draft scripts,
soundtrack and film not broadcast, and reporters' notes from sources not concerned with
confidentiality. Id.
17. Id. at 507-08.
18. Id. at 507.
19. The purpose of structuring a dichotomy between civil and criminal proceedings is
to show that society's interest in compelling testimony shifts according to the context.
Investigations of crime and enforcement of the criminal code to vindicate constitutional
rights are usually judged more compelling than actions vindicating property rights. Cases
involving the privilege issue often note that parties in civil actions, unlike criminal ac-
tions, lack constitutional status to compel testimony. Their interests may be subordinated
to freedom of the press. However, Wigmore suggests that the Due Process Clause guaran-
tees compulsory testimony for both parties in criminal and civil actions. 8 J.WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §2191 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
20. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This point is emphasized in United
[Vol. 26:185
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departed from the Branzburg method of balancing the newsperson's
constitutional rights against the public's interest in prosecuting crimi-
nal activities. Discounting that test as inappropriate for civil litigation,
the Gilbert court succinctly explained that "[a] different context re-
quires that a different balance be struck."'" Relying on Mr. Justice
Stewart's dissent in Branzburg,22 the court placed the burden of proving
the relevancy of and the necessity for subpoenaed information in a civil
matter squarely upon the party seeking the confidential materials. The
court warned that only in "rare and compelling circumstances,"'" where
the confidential information sought is both crucial to the case and unob-
tainable through other sources, would there be sufficient grounds to
defeat a First Amendment privilege. To buttress this stance, the Gilbert
court cited the concurring Branzburg opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, who
emphasized the "limited nature""4 of the majority's holding and issued
the assurance that "the courts will be available to newsmen under cir-
cumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require protec-
tion."25 Branzburg was thus interpreted as supporting, at a minimum,
a qualified privilege for confidential matters.
Two factors distinguish the holding in Gilbert from that in Branzburg:
factual differences and a philosophical divergence between the two
States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where the issue concerned whether a
First Amendment privilege sanctions a newspaper's refusal to produce evidentiary mate-
rial in its possession relevant to a criminal trial. In denying the privilege for confidential
information in the context of a criminal trial, Chief Judge Sirica noted that considerations
in civil discovery are vastly different from those in the criminal setting and explained that
"First Amendment values will weigh differently." Id. at 213 n.14.
21. 411 F. Supp. at 509.
22. 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting):
Accordingly, when a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal
confidences, I would hold that the government must (1) show that there is
probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly
relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the infor-
mation sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest
in the information.
Id.
23. 411 F.Supp. at 508.
24. 408 U.S. at 709.
25. Id. at 710. This concurrence, which infers that some kind of privilege is available,
was cited by the Gilbert court in conjunction with the Branzburg dissents. Mr. Justice
Douglas advocated an absolute privilege in his dissent in Branzburg. He explained, "My
belief is that all of the 'balancing' was done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights." Id. at
713. This argument may be used to support the contention that any limitation on press
activity has a "chilling effect" on the flow of news. Mr. Justice Stewart petitioned for a
qualified privilege in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 725-52.
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courts. While Branzburg involved a criminal case in which the public's
interest in criminal prosecution weighed heavily against the news
media's interest, Gilbert dealt with a civil trial in which the interest in
forcing the news media to reveal sources was much less weighty. Philo-
sophically, the Branzburg majority questioned the strength of the
media's contention that reporting would be undermined if confidences
were challenged."6 However, the Gilbert court expressly recognized that
revealing confidential sources would significantly deter newspersons in
providing information to the public. 7 These differences reinforce the
court's well-reasoned decision to grant a qualified privilege for confiden-
tial matters. However, the court's denial of a privilege for nonconfiden-
tial materials was not as persuasive.
The Gilbert court tersely denied any constitutional protection for non-
confidential materials."6 Faced with a lack of controlling precedent, the
court followed its own inclinations, citing little authority and offering
only perfunctory explanations. First, the court indicated that the First
Amendment offers protection only for those materials that directly lead
to the divulgence of confidences. The court cautioned, however, that
"[v]ague allegations of potential indication of confidential sources will
not suffice." 9 Second, the court discounted arguments that a compelled
disclosure of nonconfidential materials would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment as a taking of property without due process of law. Dismiss-
ing the claim as "without merit," the court explained that an incamera
inspection would not expose materials to competitors and threaten their
value.2 Third, the court ignored the media's contention that the process
of separating confidential from nonconfidential materials would be bur-
densome, time-consuming, costly and unjustifiable because it interfered
with editorial operations. Tallying the number of files involved, the
court determined that a "quick purview" would be sufficient for separa-
tion. 3
In denying a privilege for nonconfidential materials, the court in
Gilbert did not engage in extensive analysis. First, the court failed to
consider Branzburg dicta that might have provided guidance and ig-
nored the reasoning of another district court that challenged the tradi-
tional concept of confidentiality. Second, the court did not evaluate
general discovery purposes that might have supported its decision to
26. See 408 U.S. at 693.
27. See 411 F. Supp. at 508.
28. Id. at 511.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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enforce the subpoena nor did it consider two potential injuries that the
news media outlined to support the motion to quash.
In dicta, the Supreme Court in Branzburg recognized for the first time
that newsgathering qualifies for constitutional protection" because
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
would be eviscerated."3" The Gilbert court expressly acknowledged that
special consideration should be accorded the newsgathering process,
stating that "unnecessary impediments" to newsgathering efforts
threaten the quality of the news "as effectively as censorship activi-
ties. '34 Had the Branzburg observation been reviewed, the court might
have extended the privilege to nonconfidential materials, which could
be considered as much products of the newsgathering process as confi-
dential materials. By failing to consider this logical application, the
Gilbert court, in effect, undermined its own acknowledgement of the
dangers of censorship inherent in interference with newsgathering.
In denying a privilege for nonconfidential materials, the Gilbert court
ignored another district court case, Loadholtz v. Fields,5 which found
that the compelled production of even nonconfidential materials would
have a chilling effect on freedom of the press." In Loadholtz, a reporter
challenged a subpoena to compel discovery of materials relating to a
newspaper article that he wrote about an incident of alleged police
harassment. The court held that all unpublished information received
and developed by the reporter in his professional capacity was privileged
under the First Amendment and that a reporter cannot be compelled
to testify about or to produce such documents in a civil action. In grant-
ing the privilege, the Loadholtz court claimed that the confidentiality
of the materials was irrelevant to the "chilling effect" that the enforce-
ment of subpoenas would have on the press' newsgathering role"7 and on
32. For a brief history of the attempt to protect the newsgathering process and a sum-
mary of how the issue has been handled in the lower courts, see Note, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971).
33. 408 U.S. at 681. While acknowledging the right to gather news, the Court rejected
the claim that the right implies a privilege to protect the identity of news sources. After
citing numerous cases in which restrictions on the right to gather news have been sus-
tained, id. at 683-84, the Court classified the requirement to answer subpoenas and dis-
close sources as another permissible restriction. Id. at 685. The majority noted that the
"evidence fails to demonstrate there would be a significant constriction of the flow of
news to the public" if the Court reaffirmed the prior common law stance of no privilege.
Id. at 693.
34. 411 F. Supp. at 508.
35. 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
36. Id. at 1303.
37. Accord, Hendrix v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 43 Fla. Supp. 137 (1975), where
the court concluded:
19761
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the flow of information to the public.:" As the court explained, "The
compelled production of a reporter's resource materials is equally as
invidious as the compelled disclosure of his confidential informants.""'
The Gilbert court did acknowledge the importance of the free flow of
information to the public,'" but it did not review the Loadholtz observa-
tions about confidentiality. Instead, Gilbert recognized the source's
demand for confidentiality as the only ground for privileged treatment.
The court did not attempt to measure the validity of this traditional
assumption, as did the Loadholtz court. The Gilbert court's failure to
evaluate or, at least, distinguish the Loadholtz ruling may be inter-
preted as an unwillingness to support either a strong First Amendment
protection for newsgathering or the position that a countervailing inter-
est to a claim of privilege need be compelling.4
The Gilbert court based its decision to enforce the subpoena regarding
nonconfidential material on a very cursory examination of the defen-
dant's interests in obtaining information. Not even general discovery
purposes, the only interest the defendant could claim, 2 were mentioned
to support the issuance of the subpoena. In contrast, the grant of the
privilege for confidential information involved a specific examination of
the social interest in resolving conflicts justly between private litigants,
as reflected in the rules of compulsory process.4 3 Had the court explored
the defendant's need for pre-trial discovery as carefully as it considered
society's interest in the settlement of disputes, it might have provided
a stronger rationale for its decision. For instance, the defendant's re-
quest for all unpublished materials might warrant consideration if a
liberal interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted. Such an interpretation would support discovery of virtually all
Whether or not the source or information is confidential, inquiry into unpub-
lished information necessarily intrudes upon editorial decisions and can seri-
ously impair the gathering and publication of news.
Id. at 139. See Schwartz v. Almart Stores, 42 Fla. Supp. 165 (1975).
38. 389 F. Supp. at 1303.
39. Id.
40. 411 F. Supp. at 508.
41. Recognition of newsgathering as a firm right would require that its infringement be
justified by a compelling state interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963);
cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
42. The defendants originally sought discovery for general discovery purposes and to
bolster a request for change of venue. The Gilbert court noted the irrelevance of the sec-
ond claim, especially after Nationwide had presented all published materials requested
by Allied in early discovery. 411 F. Supp. at 507-08, 510.
43. Id. at 510.
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information." This argument was presented in cases cited in Gilbert"
and might have been considered by the court in explaining the grant of
defendant's request for discovery.
Two interests outlined by the movants to protect the reporters' pre-
paratory materials received only the briefest review in the Gilbert de-
cision. First, media representatives contended that any procurement
of "reporter's notes . . . and any other newsgathering materials"
amounted to a deprivation of property without due process." The mov-
ants argued that "[a] compiler, who merely gathers and arranges...
materials . . . is as much the owner of the result . . . as if his work were
a creation rather than a construction." 7 The disclosure of the news-
gatherer's compilation efforts was characterized as "tantamount to re-
vealing his thought processes."" Although classified as a deprivation of
property, the argument echoes the one advanced in Hickman v. Taylor49
to protect an attorney's work product. The Hickman court's observation
that "[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify un-
warranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an
attorney""0 has some merit in considering the value of the work of a
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
45. The Gilbert court could have advocated a liberal construction of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, an argument frequently touted in privilege cases. However, the author-
ity which the Gilbert decision noted would undermine even this stance. In Democratic
National Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973), the court, after approv-
ing a liberal application of rules and a broad subpoena similar to that requested in Gilbert
and evaluating the unique circumstances of the Watergate break-in, concluded:
This court cannot blind itself to the possible "chilling effect" the enforcement
of these broad subpoenas would have on the flow of information to the press,
and so to the public . . . .This court stands convinced that if it allows the dis-
couragement of investigative reporting into the highest level of government no
amount of legal theorizing could allay the public suspicions engendered by its
actions and by the matters alleged in these lawsuits.
Id. at 1397.
In State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974), the court warned that the right
to discovery is not of "constitutional dimension" and "[when it is confronted by policy
considerations related to a constitutional privilege, a carefully considered modification in
the light of both concerns is in order." Id. at 256. Although courts often reiterate that the
final grant of discovery requests rests with the discretion of the judge, an additional
caveat, as expressed in Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), is frequently noted: "In exercising this authority, the court must consider the
possible necessity for the information .... "
46. Memorandum for Nationwide Communications, Inc. at 18, Gilbert v. Allied
Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
47. Id. at 20, quoting 18 AM. JUR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property §11 (1965).
48. Id. at 21.
49. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
50. Id. at 510.
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newsperson. While the analogy may grow tenuous as the context shifts
from the legal adversary setting of Hickman," the premise underlying
the work product rule-that an adversary should not receive the benefit
of a "free ride" on his opponent's preparation-is applicable to the
investigations of reporters. The same "[ilnefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices" 2 that the Hickman court feared if the attorney's work
product were not protected could easily transform newspersons into con-
duits of information."' The Gilbert court's failure to perceive this possi-
bility ignores the Branzburg discussion of journalists as unpaid private
investigators"4 and the trends within the legal profession advocating a
qualified privilege for journalists' work product.5
The Gilbert court also seemed insensitive to the media's interest in
avoiding interference with news room policy. In deciding to allow discov-
ery, the court emphasized the ease with which confidential matter could
be separated from nonconfidential material without considering the pos-
sible ramifications of changing news room policy. The media representa-
tives contended that they would be forced to reconsider their policy of
retaining unpublished materials if such materials were open to discov-
ery."6 Revising the retention policy would impose a cost burden by re-
quiring the duplication of research efforts. The immediate availability
of materials to refresh a reporter's memory, verify facts, or provide valu-
able background information for a continuing investigation would be
eliminated. Similar hazards of tampering with news room policy were
recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Bursey v. United States.7 The court
quashed a motion to compel testimony regarding who was responsible
for editorial content and for distribution of a radical underground publi-
cation. The Bursey court stressed that such questions "cut deeply into
press freedom."S While Gilbert involved the alteration of the news re-
51. Hickman involved a controversy between lawyers as to the extent and type of
information that can be obtained from an opponent lawyer in the discovery process. Id.
at 497.
52. Id. at 511.
53. A rash of subpoenas to testify before grand jury investigations in the late 1960's drew
an angry reaction from journalist who felt restricted unjustly in their efforts to report
social upheaval. In response to this media concern, Attorney General John Mitchell issued
subpoena guidelines to eliminate harassment. Address by Attorney General Mitchell,
House of Delegates, American Bar Association, Aug. 10, 1970. See also 28 C.F.R. §50.10
(1973).
54. 408 U.S. at 725. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
55. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION OF THE STUDY GROUP ON JOURNALISTS'
SHIELD LEGISLATION 2, 14-15 (1973).
56. Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. at 508.
57. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
58. Id. at 1084.
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tention procedure and Bursey the revelation of editorial responsibility,
both situations portend changes in news room policy. The need for free-
dom to make unfettered policy decisions is common to both. This auton-
omy, essential to freedom of the press, was overlooked as the Gilbert
court considered only the mechanics of changing news room procedures
and not the implications of changing news room policies.59
The court's declaration that media files can be examined in a pro-
tected fashion,"' by in camera inspection, does not sufficiently explain
why they should be examined at all. The lack of a rationale for restrict-
ing the privilege to confidential materials in the face of reasoned
contrary decisions, cited by the Gilbert court,' emphasizes the arbitrar-
iness of the denial. Sound reasons for the denial, consistent with the
reasoning used to grant the privilege for confidential material, could
allay apprehension among journalists, their counsel, and potential in-
formants who may be confused about the contours of the privilege.
The lack of rationale is, in effect, silence from the court. Such silence
increases the fear expressed by the media of the possible "drying up"
of sources, 2 harassment,3 self-censorship, 4 and the transformation of
journalists into researchers for other agencies." Confronted with these
fears, the news media would be forced to reconsider newsgathering tech-
niques. Threatened by prosecution or exploitation, newspersons might
react with subterfuge, by coaching sources,66 or by re-evaluating their
information retention policies.67
59. The Court stated, in pertinent part, "The Court has the power as well as the duty
to fashion protective orders ... to secure the needed information at a minimum of public
exposure . . . [conditioned on] reasonable payment for the services rendered." 411 F.
Supp. at 511.
60. The authority cited by Gilbert indicates how other courts successfully handled
complicated patent cases without jeopardizing the secrecy of the product. Again, the
emphasis is on the mechanics of the protective effort and not on the reason such effort
had to be made. Id.
61. Gilbert cited both Loadholtz and Bursey to support its grant of a qualified privilege
protecting confidential news sources. 411 F. Supp. at 508. However, the court did not
mention either of these cases in denying a privilege for nonconfidential matters, id. at 511,
although both those decisions contain reasoning that would have been applicable. See
discussion in text accompanying notes 35-39 and 57-58 supra.
62. Memorandum of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press as Amicus
Curiae at 6, Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
63. Id.
64. Id. See also note 53 supra.
65. See note 54 supra. See also Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege
and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 ORE. L. REv. 243 (1968).
66. For a further discussion of the repercussions, see Beaver, supra note 65, at 250-57.
67. Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. at 508.
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The Gilbert court's failure to explain its order for discovery is a set-
back for the orderly evolution of the law of newsperson's privilege. As
noted in Democratic National Committee v. McCord," "a prompt judi-
cial inquiry and hopefully one that will not only be sound but which the
public will also understand and accept"' '" is necessary when a possible
Bill of Rights incursion occurs. Whether the Gilbert court met this
responsibility is questionable.
Alice M. Klement
68. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
69. Id. at 1398-99.
